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Abstract
We propose a novel technique that can generate natural-looking adversarial ex-
amples by bounding the variations induced for internal activation values in some
deep layer(s), through a distribution quantile bound and a polynomial barrier loss
function. By bounding model internals instead of individual pixels, our attack
admits perturbations closely coupled with the existing features of the original input,
allowing the generated examples to be natural-looking while having diverse and
often substantial pixel distances from the original input. Enforcing per-neuron
distribution quantile bounds allows addressing the non-uniformity of internal acti-
vation values. Our evaluation on ImageNet and five different model architecture
demonstrates that our attack is quite effective. Compared to the state-of-the-art
pixel space attack, semantic attack, and feature space attack, our attack can achieve
the same attack success/confidence level while having much more natural-looking
adversarial perturbations. These perturbations piggy-back on existing local features
and do not have any fixed pixel bounds.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attack is a prominent security threat for Deep Learning (DL) applications. Given a legal
input, perturbation is applied to the input to derive an adversarial example, which causes the DL model
to misclassify. The perturbation is usually small, e.g., [−4, 4] in the RGB range of [0, 255], such that it
is imperceptible by humans. Depending on the methods to generate such adversarial examples, there
are white-box attacks, such as PGD [1], C&W [2], BIM [3], and FGSM [4], which assume access to
model internals and leverage gradient information in sample generation, and black-box attacks, such
as ZOO [5] and boundary attack [6], that assume no access to model internals and directly mutate
inputs based on classification outputs. Our work falls into the white-box attack category in the image
classification domain.The perturbation bounds are critical for adversarial attack because a large bound
usually implies high attack success rate but a less natural-looking example. The second and third
columns of Figure 1 show a number of samples with a small bound (i.e., `∞ = 5/255, meaning the
maximum pixel value change is 5 out of 255) and a larger bound (i.e., `∞ = 16/255) for the BIM
attack1 Observe that with the larger bound, the adversarial perturbation is detectable by human eyes.
As such, it is often assumed that adversarial perturbation has a small bound. The success of a large
1We use BIM instead of other pixel space attacks such as PGD because we found that (compared to BIM)
the random initialization of PGD degrades imperceptibility at a non-trivial scale, in exchange for just a slightly
higher success rate. Hence, we consider BIM a more compelling baseline as we stress imperceptibility.
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(a) Original
(ℓ", ℓ#, conf.) (b) BIM(5/255, 67, 39.6) (c) BIM(16/255, 510, 95.0) (d) FS(150/255, 2k, 7.8) (e) SM(228/255, 3k, 15.1) (f) D2B(81/255, 867, 128.8)
(a) Original
(ℓ", ℓ#, conf.) (b) BIM(5/255, 64, -10.4) (c) BIM(16/255, 460, 8.6) (d) FS(255/255, 3.8k, 15.4) (e) SM(243/255, 15k, 31.5) (f) D2B(58/255, 586, 34.8)
Figure 1: Adversarial examples of different attacks/attack-settings. The first column represents
the original images. The second and third columns shows examples from Basic Iterative Method
(BIM) with a small and a large pixel distances, respectively. The following columns are samples
from Feature Space Attack(FS), Semantic Attack (SM) and our Deep Distribution Bounded Attack
(D2B). For each set of images, the first row presents the adversarial examples. The second row
shows the perturbations applied to the original image. We enlarge the perturbations of BIM by 10
times and the others’ by 5 times for better illustration. On the bottom of each column, there is a
triple representing the `∞, `2 distances and the attack confidence of each example. A positive value
indicates the attack yielded misclassification and a large value indicates the model is very confident
about the (misclassification) result.
number of existing defense, verification, and validation techniques [1, 3, 7–17] are based on such
assumption. For example, given a particular input and a small bound, many techniques aim to prove
that a model must not misclassify for any perturbation within the bound [13–15, 18].
Recently, researchers have shown that adversarial examples with large pixel distances (from the
original inputs) can be generated. Such distances are usually way beyond the bounds that many
existing defense and validation techniques aim to protect, providing a new attack vector. Specifically,
semantic attack [19] manipulates the color and texture of a benign image, through a specifically
modified colorization model and a texture transfer method. Feature space attack [20] leverages
style transfer [21] to mutate the (implicit) styles of normal inputs to derive adversarial examples.
In particular, it perturbs the distribution (e.g., mean and variation) of internal feature map to inject
malicious and largely human-imperceptible style differences that lead to misclassification. The
third and fourth columns in Figure 1 show some examples for feature attack and semantic attack,
respectively. Observe that they have much larger `∞ and `2 distances (from the original inputs
in the first column) than the examples generated by BIM attacks. While they are in general more
natural-looking compared to examples generated by pixel space attacks with a similar distance, the
perturbations are quite noticeable in human eyes. This is confirmed by our human study (Section 4.1),
in which we show that with a 80% attack success rate, humans can clearly recognize the adversarial
examples. The root cause is that these techniques focus on mutating meta features of original inputs,
such as colors and styles, due to the difficulty of harnessing perturbations on content features, such as
shapes and local patterns. However, a successful semantic/feature attack may still entail substantial
meta feature mutation, degrading the attack’s stealthiness. More discussion on related work can be
found in Section 2.
2
In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial attack that can perform stealthy content feature mutation.
The last column of Figure 1 shows the examples generated by our technique and its pixel level contrast
with the original image. Observe that the differences largely piggy back on the content features of the
original example (by having similar shapes and local content patterns as the original inputs), making
them human imperceptible. In comparison, the differences of the examples generated by semantic
and feature space attacks are more pervasive and global. For example, the feature space attack on
the cat image induces a global checkerboard style, while our attack induces perturbations that reside
as part of the local features of the cat. The semantic attack on the barrow image below generates
visible color blocks, while our attack induces more perturbations for places that have intensive local
features and less perturbations for those with disperse local features such as the snowy background.
According to our human study in Section 4.1, our technique can achieve 95% attack success rate and
yet humans cannot easily distinguish the adversarial examples from the benign ones.
The essence of our technique is to bound internal activation changes instead of bounding the pixel
space changes like many existing techniques. Assuming internal neurons represent implicit features,
particularly content features, small perturbations to the activations of these neurons denote small
variations of the corresponding features. However, we find it challenging to properly control internal
perturbations. A naive method of limiting the variation of activation values after ReLU function to a
range does not work and leads to abrupt pixel space perturbations that are human visible. The reason
is that a small activation change after ReLU may entail substantial value change before the ReLU
and eventually human perceivable pixel mutations in the input space. Moreover, while in the pixel
space, a perturbation value range has consistent meaning/effect across multiple pixels, an internal
value perturbation range does not possess such consistency across multiple neurons. For instance,
small activation changes may significantly affect classification result and entail substantial pixel space
changes (in order to achieve such inner differences) for some neurons, while activation changes with
an orders-of-magnitude larger scale may have very little effect for some other neurons. These pose
new challenges to the underlying optimization methods.
In order to address these challenges, we propose the following solutions. Given a model, its internal
structure is inspected to select a place whose inner values roughly follow normal distributions.
We call it a throttle plane, which is a notion with finer granularity than a layer in deep learning
model. Intuitively, consider that a layer consists of many operations, such as matrix multiplication,
vector additions, and application of activation functions. A throttle plane is defined by one of such
operations in a layer. ReLU functions are not good candidates for throttle planes as the activation
value distributions for individual neurons (over all training samples) usually do not follow a normal
distribution (see Section 3.1). After identifying the throttle plane, for each neuron on the plane, we
collect its inner value distribution over the training set. Such distributions allow us to provide neuron-
specific bounds during perturbation. These bounds are defined based on the normal distributions
(e.g., 10% quantile change). We then enforce the bound using a polynomial internal barrier loss
(Section 3.2). Barrier method (BM) [22] is a method developed for constrained optimization problems.
Intuitively, it adds substantial penalty through a barrier loss when a value approaches its boundary.
By default, BM uses a log-based barrier loss, which is not ideal and has numerical instability
problems in our context. We hence develop a polynomial loss function. We conduct experiments on
ImageNet and five models, including both naturally and adversarially trained models. Comparative
experiments with state-of-the-art pixel-space/feature/semantic attacks show that our attack produces
adversarial examples that are much more natural-looking when achieving the same level of attack
conference/success-rate. Further evaluation against three different detection techniques demonstrates
that our attack has better/comparable persistence compared to other attacks while having better
imperceptibility, due to the new vulnerable aspects it attacks.
2 Other Related Work
In addition to the aforementioned works, Song et al. [23] considered generating unbounded adversarial
examples through GAN-based method. Hosseini and Poovendran [24] and Laidlaw and Feizi
[25] proposed to uniformly change the color and the lightning condition to construct adversarial
examples. In comparison, D2B attacks local content features. Kumari et al. [26] applied `∞ bounded
perturbation on internal activation to strengthen the effect of adversarial training. It leveraged a two-
step optimization method. However, its internal bound is uniform. We show in Appendix 6.2 that their
optimization is not effective for our purpose. Xie et al. [27] proposed to denoise internal activation
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Figure 2: Workflow of our attack. It consists of three steps: 1© throttle plane (TP) selection, 2©
internal distribution boundary constraint, and 3© adversarial sample generation with combined losses.
for better adversarial training. Inkawhich et al. [28] found simulating the feature representation of
target images can increase attack transferability.
3 Attack Design
Figure 2 describes the workflow of our attack. Given a target model and its training set, we first
perform throttle plane (TP) selection (step 1©). Specifically, we run the target model over the training
dataset and collect the inner value distributions at the end of individual operations along the forward
data path (e.g., multiplication with a kernel matrix). The values for the same operation across all
neurons and channels form a plane (e.g., the blue and gray planes in Figure 2). Note that since a layer
may consist of multiple operations, it may have multiple planes. A plane whose value distribution has
a normal distribution is a possible throttle plane (TP) to harness the adversarial perturbation (e.g., the
blue plane in Figure 2). With a (or multiple) selected throttle plane(s), we further inspect the possible
distribution boundary for each neuron at step 2©. That is, the perturbed value A′ should be bounded
within some distribution quantile range of the original value A. Finally, we model the constraint of
distribution boundary by an internal barrier loss function, which is combined with the cross-entropy
prediction loss. During attack (step 3©), a normal input is fed to the model and updated with respect
to the combined attack loss, which produces a successful natural-looking adversarial example.
3.1 Distribution based Bounding and Throttle Plane Selection
The overarching design of our attack is to harness perturbation at the selected throttle plane(s) such
that only small variations of abstract features are allowed. Note that the corresponding pixel space
perturbations could be substantial as long as the inner value changes are within bound. Identifying
appropriate throttle plane(s) is the first challenge we need to address. Intuitively, if we consider model
execution as horizontal data flow from the input space to the output space, a plane contains the values
lie in a vertical cut of the data flow. The cut could lie in the border between layers or even in between
operations within a layer. Formally, a plane consists of all the values right after an operation along
the data flow from the input space to the output space across all the neurons/channels. As such, the
input values and the output values form planes; the activation values right after the activation function
of a layer form a plane too.
Challenges of Having Internal Throttle Plane. Traditional adversarial sample generation tech-
niques simply place the perturbation throttle at the input plane. This makes the design simple as the
perturbation happens exactly within the throttle plane. In contrast, placing the throttle in an inner
plane poses new challenges.
First of all, while in the input space values have uniform semantics (e.g., denoting the RGB values of
individual pixels), values in the inner space do not have such property. The different values on the
same inner plane often denote different abstract features whose value ranges have diverse semantics.
As such, a uniform perturbation bound across all these internal values is meaningless. Second, in
our design, the perturbation occurs in the input space while the throttle is placed somewhere inside
the model. Hence, the perturbation is not directly controlled and could be substantial. An important
hypothesis is that since the perturbations can only induce bounded inner value changes at the throttle
plane, they denote small semantic mutations of the abstract features. However, given a particular
inner value, the semantic mutation entailed by its changes is non-uniform within its range. Consider
Figure 3 (b), which denotes the distribution of an inner value (across the training set). Observe that
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Figure 3: Operations in the last block of group 4 of an adversarially trained ResNet152 and typical
distribution of some value on different planes
variation of 1 when the value is 2 implies much more substantial semantic changes (indicated by
the entailed substantial quantile change) than when the value is 20, which is at the very tail of the
distribution, as the model is likely insensitive to such a large value.
Our Design – Looking for Normal Distributions. According to the above discussion, we cannot
utilize a uniform bound across the different inner values (on the plane); we cannot utilize the same
bound even when the value varies (from one input to another). Therefore, we propose a novel idea of
utilizing distribution based bounds. Particularly, we collect the distributions for the individual values
(on the plane). During perturbation, the bound for each inner value is based on its distribution. As
such, not only different values along the plane have different bounds, but also the value may have
different bound when it varies from input to input. In particular, we select the plane(s) whose values
have normal distributions, which allows us to have precise and relatively easy control of the level of
semantic mutation allowed, by using a quantile bound based on the current value and its distribution,
instead of using a concrete value bound. In the following, we use a few examples to illustrate the
reasons of looking for inner throttle plane with normal distributions.
Take a block of an adversarially trained ResNet152 for example (Figure 3 (a)). If we set the throttle
plane at the block boundary (i.e., right after the ReLU function), the distribution for some value on
the plane (across the entire training set) is shown in Figure 3 (b). Observe that while the distribution
is dense on the positive side, the negative side is vacant (due to ReLU). It is hence not a good choice
for throttle plane. The reason is that we completely lose control on the negative side. Intuitively,
substantial input perturbations would be admitted as long as they do not cause the inner value to
flip from negative to positive after ReLU. This would substantially degenerate the naturalness of the
generated adversarial samples (see Figure 4(b) for an example). If we set the plane right before ReLU,
according to Figure 3 (c), it is a skewed distribution. By inspecting the block structure, we find that the
value is the sum of the shortcut and the main output (please refer to [29] for the explanation of these
terms of ResNet structure). The skew is mainly due to the shortcut. It creates difficulty for enforcing
a quantile bound as it is hard to have a general way of modeling such distribution. Figure 4(c) shows
an adversarial example generated by putting the throttle at this plane. Observe that it is not natural
either. We further inspect the plane right before the sum operation. Figure 3 (d) shows one of the
distributions. Observe that it can be modeled as a normal distribution. Bounding this plane leads to
a natural-looking adversarial Figure 4(d) 2. Figure 12(e) in Appendix 6.10 shows the distributions
for a set of randomly selected values on the same plane. Observe they approximately follow normal
distributions. Also observe that their distribution parameters are quite different, supporting our design
of using different bounds for various values on a plane.
Upon sample generation, given a benign input, the inner values on the selected throttle plane(s)
are collected. The bound of a value is then determined by its quantile of the value (on its density
function). How to enforce such quantile bounds is discussed in the following section.
3.2 Enforcing Quantile Bound with Polynomial Barrier Loss
Let D be a distribution on support S . The activation yi of neuron i on a selected throttle plane I is a
random variable through mapping fi : S → R, yi ∼ fi(D). We denote the cumulative distribution
2In this case, we also bound another throttle plane to control the values along the shortcut. The two throttle
planes together form a complete cut of the forward dataflow.
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(a) Original (b) After ReLU (c) Before ReLU (d) Before Sum
Figure 4: Adversarial images when the throttle plane is placed at different positions in the last block
of group 4 of an adversarially trained Resnet-152 model, under the same perturbation bound.
function of yi as Ci(x), and the corresponding quantile function as C
−1
i . Let the original image
be xnat and the adversarial sample be xadv. Correspondingly, let yi
adv and yi
nat be the respective
activations from xnat and xadv. Assume the allowed quantile change is less than a threshold . The
corresponding value bound for yadvi ∈ [lowi,highi], is hence [Ci(C−1i (xnat)−), Ci(C−1i (xnat)+)].
Note that we translate the quantile bound to a value bound, over which we can define a loss function.
Polynomial Barrier Loss. Interior point method or barrier method [22] is a standard technique
for constrained optimization. It is widely used in linear programming applications [30]. It utilizes
a negative log function in the loss function by default. However, it was intended to be used in
problems where the bound is hard, meaning the values must not exceed the bound as the loss becomes
infinitely large when the value infinitely approaches the bounds. In our context, a hard bound does not
work well with ReLU functions. Specifically, input changes guided by gradients may activate some
previously inactive neurons, leading to the inner values to exceed their bounds, causing numerical
exceptions (on the log function). Another naive design is to introduce a ReLU kind of bound, that is,
the loss is 0 while the value is in bound and some large value otherwise. However, such a design does
not apply penalty when the value is approaching the bound.
Therefore, we devise a polynomial barrier loss function as follows.
Li(yiadv) = k
[
ReLU(yi
adv − yinat)
highi − yinat
+
ReLU(yi
nat − yiadv)
yinat − lowi
]b
We empirically set k = 1e5 and b = 200. Intuitively, the loss function applies an extremely large
penalty (by the power b = 200) when the inner value induced by adversarial perturbation is beyond
the bound. When the value is within the bound and close to the boundary values, measured by the
two fractions, a large penalty is applied, discouraging the value from going beyond. For example,
when yi
adv is larger than yi
nat and close to the upper bound high, say ReLU(yi
adv−yinat)
high−yinat = 0.99, the
loss is 1e5× 0.99200 ≈ 1e4. We have also tried a linear barrier loss, which cannot effectively enforce
the bound. Please refer to Appendix 6.1 for detailed discussion.
Optimization Method. With the polynomial barrier loss, we use a regular gradient sign method [2]
for optimization. There are other design choices. For example, in [26], a two-step optimization was
proposed to facilitate adversarial example generation by leveraging internal values. Specifically, it
first perturbs the internal values at some inner layer to induce misclassification and then it uses a
mean squared error loss to optimize the input to achieve the optimized inner values. However, we
found that the method is not that effective when a strict internal boundary is enforced. The reason
is that the first step of inner layer optimization tends to find local minimals that are infeasible for
input optimization due to the strong correlations across inner values. In contrast, our method directly
optimizes at the input space. Another simple method is clipping, which clips the inner values (on a
throttle plane) and prevents gradient propagation if they are beyond bounds. Our experience shows
that such a simple method can hardly work either. We conduct an experiment to compare the three
methods. Our method can better enforce the internal bound and generate adversarial examples with
one order of magnitude smaller average boundary size. Details can be found in Appendix 6.2. How to
identify the appropriate learning rate is discussed in Appendix 6.5. In some rare cases, the generated
examples may have checkerboard patterns. We use an additional feature smoothing step to mitigate
such effects. Details can be found in Appendix 6.3.
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(a) Targeted attacks on Resnet50 (b) Untargeted attacks on Resnet152-Adv
Figure 5: Quality of generated adversarial examples. In (a) the targeted attack, the x axis represents
the average confidence of adversarial examples, where a confidence value indicates the level of
success of the attack with a greater than 0 value meaning the model misclassifies to the target label.
The y axis denotes the rate that humans consider the adversarial examples real (compared to the
benign images), with 50% meaning humans cannot distinguish an adversarial example from its benign
version. In (b) the untargeted attacks against the adversarially trained ResNet152, we use the attack
success rate as the x axis. Note that we cannot use attack success rate in the targeted attacks as all
those attacks have close to 100% success rate because the model was normally trained. The y axis is
the same as in (a). We regard an untargeted attack successful if the true label does not appear in the
top-5 predicted labels, which is consistent with the literature [27]. The vertical bar on a data point
(i.e., an attack setting) represents the standard error of the human preference rate.
Table 1: Pixel and quantile distances for
ResNet50, with Conf. meaning attack confi-
dence
Attack Conf. Pixel Dist. `∞ Quantile Dist.
`2 `∞ Plane 1 Plane 2 Plane 3
BIM4 81.91 10.81 0.04 0.62 0.83 0.90
D2B10 30.29 4.26 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09
D2B20 58.82 6.27 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.17
D2B30 72.43 7.28 0.10 0.18 0.24 0.26
D2B40 80.06 7.88 0.11 0.24 0.32 0.35
D2B50 84.52 8.25 0.11 0.30 0.41 0.44
Table 2: Pixel and quantile distances for
ResNet152-Adv, with Succ. meaning attack suc-
cess rate
Attack Succ. Pixel Dist. `∞ Quantile Dist.
`2 `∞ Plane 1 Plane 2 Plane 3
BIM4 0.58 14.49 0.04 0.65 0.82 0.89
D2B10 0.61 6.65 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.09
D2B20 0.86 15.43 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.17
D2B30 0.86 16.68 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.26
D2B40 0.97 21.84 0.22 0.26 0.33 0.35
D2B50 0.98 27.08 0.26 0.33 0.41 0.44
4 Experiments
To evaluate our attack and the quality of generated adversarial examples, we conduct experiments on
one of the largest image datasets, ImageNet [31]. We use five types of DNN models in the evaluation
and compare the quality of our generated adversarial examples with three existing attack methods.
Finally, we evaluate our attack on three popular adversarial detection approaches.
4.1 Visual Quality of Generated Examples
In this section, we evaluate the visual quality of generated adversarial examples by our attack. We
also compare our technique with three existing attack methods: BIM [3], feature space attack [20] and
semantic attack [19]. We use these four attack methods to generate adversarial examples for a naturally
trained ResNet50 model [32] and an adversarially trained ResNet152 model [33] (ResNet152-adv),
respectively. For BIM, feature space attack and our attack, we stop the attack optimization when
convergence is reached (no confidence increase). For semantic attack, we use a preset number of
optimization steps. Note that it is unbounded and the optimization step controls the perturbation and
the attack success rate. Details about throttle planes used are discussed in Appendix 6.7.
In order to measure the naturalness of generated examples, we perform a human study using Amazon
Turk. We employ a similar setting as that in [34]. Specifically, for each attack setting, users are given
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100 pairs of images, each consisting of a real image and its adversarial counterpart. They are asked to
choose the one that looks real. Each user is given 5 test-drives before the study starts. Each pair of
image appears on screen for 5 seconds and is evaluated by three different users. The experiment is
performed for each attack setting. There are totally 26 settings (for the four attacks) and 156 users
participated in our study. 155 out of the 156 responses are considered valid, with those deviating far
from the majority (exceeding two times of the standard deviation) removed. We post all the examples
used in human study online [35].
Figure 5 shows the results. BIMx denotes the Basic Iterative Method [3] with an `∞ bound x%
of 255. For example, BIM4 means the `∞ bound is 255 × 4% ≈ 11. Feature space attack selects
an internal layer and then performs bounded perturbation of the mean and variance of the feature
maps at that layer [20]. FS1 and FS2 are feature space attacks using the relu2_1 and relu3_1 layers
of VGG16, respectively, as the perturbation layers. SMx is semantic attack with an optimization
step of x and the number of clusters set to 8 [19]. For our attack, we use the average observed
internal value `∞ quantile change (at a throttle plane) for the adversarial examples by BIM4 as a
reference. D2Bx denotes that we allow x% of the average quantile change observed in BIM4 at the
throttle plane. Figure 5a shows the results for targeted attacks on the naturally trained ResNet50
and Figure 5b for untargeted attacks on the adversarially trained ResNet152. We can see that our
attack has the highest attack confidence/success rate at the same level of human preference; and
given a same confidence/success rate, our adversarial examples are consistently more favored by
the testers (for being more natural-looking), compared to those by other attacks. Our adversarial
examples with the most aggressive settings (e.g., D2B40 and D2B50) have similar human preference
to pixel space attack with a very small bound (BIM2 and BIM4), indicating our attack is indeed
imperceptible. With the increase of quantile change, perturbation bound, or optimization step, all the
attacks achieve a higher success rate, and our attack is increasingly more imperceptible than others.
We further study the pixel distance and quantile distance of the generated adversarial examples by
different attacks. Table 1 and Table 2 show that with a similar level of attack confidence or attack
success rate, our attack has smaller `2 pixel distance and `∞ quantile distance. This indicates that our
generated examples can achieve a similar level of attack effectiveness with less perturbation, and they
are hence more natural-looking. In other words, it can tolerate more aggressive perturbation without
degrading naturalness as much, demonstrating the benefits of bounding deep layers. The larger `∞
pixel distance and the smaller `2 pixel distance (compared to BIM4) indicate our perturbations are
more diverse, heavily piggy-backing on original features. The attack effectiveness and pixel/internal
distances for other models are similar. Details can be found in Appendix 6.8. More adversarial
examples generated by the different settings of our attack can be found in Figure 9 and Figure 10 in
Appendix 6.9. We also conduct a study about the essence of D2B by studying the places that it aims
to attack. Details can be found in Appendix 6.6.
4.2 Evaluation Against Detection Approaches
We evaluate D2B against three popular detection approaches: feature squeezing [36], JPEG [37],
and Hu et al. [38]. We generate 100 adversarial examples for each of these approaches. For feature
squeezing, we use the same settings as in the original paper [36]. For JPEG [37], we compress the
image with 75 quality. For Hu et al. [38], we use 30 examples for fine-tuning the threshold and
the remaining 70 for testing. We compare with three existing attack methods: BIM [3] (BIM4),
feature space attack [20] (FS1) and semantic attack [19] (SM50), whose settings were discussed in
Section 4.1. For all the attacks, we generate untargeted adversarial examples against the adversarially
trained ResNet152 and targeted examples against the naturally trained ResNet50, without knowing
the existence of detection methods (i.e., not adaptive). Table 3 and Table 4 show the results. The
three columns for feature squeezing are the results for different defense settings. We can observe
that our untargeted attack D2B40 has the highest human preference. In the meantime, it achieves
better success rates than the other attacks for feature squeezing and JPEG; and comparable (and
high) attack success rates for Hu et al. [38]. Recall that these attacks are on an adversarially trained
model and hence the detection techniques may not be able to add much, especially for our attack
that closely couples perturbation with existing features. Similarly for the targeted attacks, with a
clearly better human preference rates, our attack is more or comparably persistent in the presence
of detection. Note that since this is a normally trained model, some detection techniques such as
feature squeezing may provide very good defense. Observe that our human preference rates in both
scenarios are high, indicating that our attack may potentially conduct more aggressive perturbation to
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Table 3: Untargeted attacks on the adversarially
trained ResNet152-Adv and detection, with Pref.
meaning human preference
Attack
Feature Squeezing
JPEG Hu et al. [38] Pref.
2x2 11-3-4 5-bit
BIM4 50/100 55/100 57/100 57/100 48/70 30%
FS1 46/100 46/100 46/100 48/100 48/70 35%
SM50 51/100 51/100 60/100 60/100 44/70 29%
D2B40 79/100 97/100 99/100 64/100 46/70 41%
Table 4: Targeted attacks on ResNet50 and de-
tection, with Pref. human preference
Attack
Feature Squeezing
JPEG Hu et al. [38] Pref.
2x2 11-3-4 5-bit
BIM4 30/100 91/100 100/100 51/100 46/70 27%
FS1 6/100 25/100 53/100 24/100 65/70 36%
SM50 0/100 4/100 10/100 1/100 49/70 21%
SM500 5/100 72/100 95/100 46/100 48/70 14%
D2B100 37/100 88/100 100/100 57/100 60/70 50%
evade detection (e.g., through adaptive attack). We want to point out while these detection techniques
were not designed to guard against our attack, it is still worthwhile to understand how D2B performs
in the presence of these techniques. Detection and defense (e.g., adversarial training) specific for
our attack will be the future work. We have also conducted a transferbility study of our attack. We
observe that D2B has a comparable/slightly-better transferbility than other attacks. Details can be
found in Appendix 6.4.
5 Conclusion
We propose a novel adversarial attack that can generate natural-looking adversarial examples by
bounding model internals. It leverages a per-neuron normal distribution quantile bound and a
polynomial barrier loss to handle the non-uniform bounds for internal values. Our evaluation on
ImageNet, five models, and comparison with three other state-of-the-art attacks demonstrates that
the examples generated by our attack are more natural. It is also more persistent in the presence of
various existing detection techniques.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Comparison of Two Barrier Loss Functions
Besides the polynomial barrier loss function, we have also tried a linear barrier loss Li(yiadv) =
k{ReLU [yiadv − (b · high + (1− b) · yinat)]+ ReLU [(b · low + (1− b) · yinat)− yiadv]}. The
coefficient b allows us to start applying (linear) penalty when the value approaches the boundaries.
Empirically we set k = 1e6 and b = 0.95.
(a) Optimization Speed (b) Optimization Feasibility
Figure 6: Comparison of two barrier loss functions. Graph (a) represents the success rate (y axis)
after a given number of steps of optimization (x axis). Graph(b) represents for a given success rate
(x), how many examples have internal values within their boundary (axis).
We observe that the linearly growing penalty is not strong enough to discourage bound violation
even with a large k value. Figure 6 presents the polynomial barrier loss both converges faster and
constrains the optimization better than the linear loss.
6.2 Comparing Optimization Methods
As discussed in Section 3.2, there are other optimization methods that can be used for our adversarial
example generation such as two-step optimization and clipping. We conduct an experiment for
those methods in comparison with our polynomial barrier method. The same optimizer, i.e., the
Gradient Sign Method, is used for all the methods during evaluation. We use the adversarially trained
ResNet152 model as our study subject. The throttle plane used in this evaluation is the plane before
the shortcut sum operation in the last layer of Block 2. We use a bound of 1% of the difference
between the minimum and maximum activation values, which are computed on the entire training
dataset. Here, we use a value bound instead of a quantile bound to make different optimization
methods comparable. For the two-step optimization method, we set the number of iterations to 100.
At each iteration, we first optimize the internal values once and then the input ten times. We set the
step size to 10% of the internal boundary for the internal optimization, and 2.6e−3 × 255 for the
input optimization. This optimization setting is similar to that in the paper [26]. For the clipping
method, we optimize for 1000 iterations, and at each iteration we update the input once using the step
size of 2.6e−3× 255. For our algorithm, we run 1000 iterations with the step size of 6.2e−3× 255.
Table 5: Comparison of optimization methods.
Method
Boundary
Consistency Success Rate
Feasibility Average Size
Polynomial Barrier Method 97% 91% Yes 25.8%
Two-step Optimization 0% 204% No 21.9%
Clipping 0% 429% No 21.9%
Table 5 illustrates the results. Feasibility denotes the percentage of samples remaining in boundary
after the optimization. Average size denotes the average boundary size of all the samples. We calculate
the size using the equation maxi∈I
[
ReLU(yi
adv−yinat)
high−yinat +
ReLU(yi
nat−yiadv)
yinat−low
]
. Consistency denotes if
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the target internal values can be produced in the original model. Note that these optimization methods
insert additional operations (e.g., clipping) that essentially change the dataflow of the original model.
An observed internal value in the optimizing model may not be feasible in the original model. Success
rate measures the percentage of generated samples that successfully induce misclassifications. It can
be observed that most samples are still feasible after our optimization, while the other two methods
cannot enforce the bound. Note that even though the clipping method clips internal values and
suppresses gradients, updates on the input can still induce internal values that go beyond bound. The
average boundary size of our method is much smaller than the other two, indicating that our barrier
loss function can effectively enforce the bound. Adversarial samples generated by the other two
methods are hence much less natural-looking. For consistency, we observe that the two baseline
methods do not have any guarantee. As the subject model is adversarially trained and the internal
bound is very tight, the attack is difficult to succeed. Nonetheless, our method still outperforms the
baselines regarding the attack success rate.
6.3 Feature Smoothing
Occasionally, we observe the generated adversarial examples exhibit checkerboard patterns. Fig-
ure 7(a) shows a typical adversarial example with checkerboard pattern (zoomed in on the right). We
observe these cases often occur when we attack VGG model but not ResNet152. We speculate that
this is because we enforce bounds for individual values (on a throttle plane) independently and do not
consider their joint distribution of nearby neurons. To mitigate the problem, we add a feature smooth-
ing loss to the optimization goal. The intuition is that individual values (on a plane) have a similar
trend of change with their neighboring values. Thus we calculate the average of surrounding changes
and use a mean squared error loss to prevent the change from being too far away from the average.
Suppose y ∈ RD×H×W denotes a throttle plane with channel D, height H and width W . The quan-
tile changes are written as ∆Qd,h,w = |C−1d,h,w(yadvd,h,w)−C−1d,h,w(ynatd,h,w)|/. The average of changes
made to nearby values can be formulated with an average pooling operation AvgPool3×3(∆Q). Thus
we expect the smoothness loss, written as αD·H·W
∑
d,h,w[AvgPool3×3(∆Q)d,h,w −∆Qd,h,w]2 to
be small. We empirically set the weight of smooth loss to α = 10. This can lead to 6% improvement
on the human preference rate for VGG16. After adding the smoothness loss, the checkerboard pattern
is largely eliminated as shown in Figure 7(b).
Figure 7: Results before and after smoothing for a VGG16 model
6.4 Transferability of Generated Adversarial Examples
In this section, we study the transferability of adversarial examples generated by different attacks.
We launch untargeted attacks on ResNet152-Adv and targeted attacks on ResNet50. We use the same
attack success criterion as in Section 4.1: (1) targeted adversarial examples should induce the same
target label when transferred to a second model; (2) untargeted adversarial examples should exclude
the true label from appearing in the top-5 predicted labels when transferred. We test generated
adversarial samples on 4 different models, including ResNet50’ (with the same structure but different
parameters as the previously used ResNet50), VGG19, MobileNet and DenseNet. The results can be
found in Table 6 and Table 7. We observe that our untargeted attack has higher human preference
than other attacks with comparable transferability. For targeted attacks, our method outperforms other
methods in both transferability and human performance. Note that transferring targeted attack is a
challenging task and requires specific approaches (e.g., ensemble) to improve the transferability.
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Table 6: Transferability of untargeted attacks. Adversarial examples are generated on ResNet152-Adv
model.
Attack Transfer to Human Preference
ResNet50’ VGG19 DenseNet121 MobileNet-V1
PGD-4 50/100 60/100 46/100 61/100 30%
FS1 43/100 51/100 39/100 52/100 35%
SM50 49/100 57/100 48/100 47/100 29%
D2B40 55/100 56/100 47/100 60/100 41%
D2B50 67/100 63/100 57/100 70/100 20%
Table 7: Transferability of targeted attacks. Adversarial examples are generated on ResNet50 model.
Attack Transfer to Human Preference
ResNet50’ VGG19 DenseNet121 MobileNet-V1
PGD-4 37/100 0/100 0/100 1/100 27%
FS1 17/100 2/100 0/100 1/100 36%
SM50 2/100 0/100 0/100 0/100 21%
SM500 32/100 0/100 1/100 0/100 14%
D2B100 44/100 0/100 0/100 0/100 50%
6.5 Binary Search for Optimization Step Size
In our adversarial example generation, a proper step size (learning rate) is crucial for reliable
optimization. A small change on the input can lead to a large quantile change on an internal throttle
plane, which makes the optimization osillating and may even lead to numerical exceptions. Choosing
an optimal step size depends on model structure and the selected throttle plane(s). It is impossible
to manually preset a step size for all the cases. We hence leverage binary search to look for an
appropriate step size.
Specifically, we first determine a possible search range for step size, e.g. [0, 255] for the gradient
sign method on RGB values. We then choose the median value of the search range as a probing
step size. We use this probing step size to conduct optimization for a given number of steps. If the
internal quantile change goes beyond the boundary, it means the probing step size is too large for
the optimization. We hence update the upper bound of the search range to the current probing value.
Otherwise, we update the lower bound with the probing value. We repeat the above search procedure
for a given number of iterations.
6.6 Differential Analysis - Understanding the Essence of D2B
In this experiment, we give D2B a very small internal bound, i.e., 5e-4% quantile change on the
throttle plane of ResNet50. As such, the pixels changes enabled by the bound indeed are so small
that they essentially denote the input gradients induced by our method. We also conduct a similar
experiment for the pixel space BIM method (with approximately the same `∞ = 2.77e−05× 255)
for reference. The results are presented in Figure 8, where the pixel differences between adversarial
example and their original versions are presented. We observe that the “gradients” in pixel space
attacks are more prevalent and uniform, whereas the “gradients” in our attack closely couple with the
existing content features. Note that the experiment cannot be done on feature attack and semantic
attack as there is no way to enforce a small bound for those attacks.
6.7 Choosing Throttle Planes
As we know, different layers represent features of various types, e.g., shallow layers for concrete
features and deep layers for abstract features. For imperceptibility, a good idea is to simultaneously
harness both concrete features (e.g. local textures) and abstract features (e.g. global outlines). Driven
by this intuition, we use multiple throttle planes simultaneously instead of a single one. Guided by our
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(a) Real Image
(b) Difference on
Pixel Boundary
(c) Difference on
Deep Distribution
Bound
Figure 8: Differential Analysis. The first row denotes benign examples. The following two rows
are pixel-wise differences between benign inputs and their corresponding adversarial versions. The
second row is from BIM and the third row ours. Both have very small bounds. The differences are
scaled up by a factor of 2e6 for the two respective rows for better display.
principle of looking for normal distributions, we check the normality of various layers in an model
and identify a throttle plane list. We empirically choose three representative throttle planes for each
model. We conduct the selection of the throttle planes for ResNet152-Adv and VGG16. The specific
locations of throttle planes we choose can be found in the following Table 8, and the corresponding
distribution samples from these chosen throttle planes can be found at Appendix 6.10. For models
other than the aforementioned ones, we makes use of a proxy method. Specifically, for a given benign
input, we pass it to the subject model and also a proxy model, which is either ResNet152-Adv or
VGG16 having well chosen throttle planes. The cross entropy loss is computed from the subject
model whereas the barrier loss is computed from the proxy model, achieving using the proxy model
internals to bound the changes while causing misclassification for the subject model. This leverages
the observation that VGG and adversarially trained ResNet have good feature extraction and hence
are more suitable for deep bounding. For the visual quality studies, we consistently used the throttle
planes from VGG16.
Table 8: Chosen throttle planes for each model
Model Plane 1 Plane 2 Plane 3
ResNet152-Adv a. the first conv. b. group 1 b. group 2
VGG16 a. conv1_2 a. conv2_2 a. conv3_3
Notation a. represents right after an operation. Notation b. represents the throttle plane which lies in
the last block in the group and before the sum operation of the shortcut; conv. represents a convolution
layer.
6.8 Evaluation on Different Models and Their Corresponding Distances
In this section, we evaluate D2B with different quantile changes on 4 models including DenseNet,
MobileNet, VGG19 and ResNet50. We use the same setting as in Section 4.1. The results are shown
in Table 9. We have similar observations as in Table 1 (Section 4.1). With a similar or higher level
of attack confidence, our attack has a smaller `2 pixel distance and `∞ quantile distance on all the
three planes compared to BIM4. This indicates that our attack is more effective in bounding internal
perturbations and can generate more natural-looking adversarial examples. We also observe that D2B
induces a larger `∞ pixel distance with a smaller `2 pixel distance compared to BIM4 at similar level
of attack confidence, which indicates the piggy-backing nature of our attack.
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Table 9: Targeted attacks on various models
Models Attack Confidence
Pixel Distance `∞ Quantile Distance
`2 `∞ Plane 1 Plane 2 Plane 3
MobileNet
BIM4 47.64 10.51 0.04 0.58 0.78 0.88
D2B10 26.17 3.22 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
D2B20 39.82 4.86 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.17
D2B30 44.52 5.55 0.07 0.17 0.23 0.26
D2B40 47.04 5.92 0.08 0.22 0.30 0.34
D2B50 47.92 5.99 0.08 0.28 0.38 0.43
DenseNet
BIM4 49.21 10.68 0.04 0.59 0.81 0.89
D2B10 20.60 3.48 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
D2B20 41.14 5.74 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.17
D2B30 50.94 6.81 0.09 0.17 0.24 0.26
D2B40 56.33 7.45 0.10 0.23 0.33 0.35
D2B50 60.10 7.93 0.11 0.29 0.40 0.44
VGG19
BIM4 56.64 12.13 0.04 0.68 0.88 0.97
D2B10 -2.33 2.82 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.09
D2B20 7.60 5.58 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.19
D2B30 18.37 7.97 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.29
D2B40 29.74 9.87 0.12 0.27 0.35 0.38
D2B50 40.49 11.59 0.14 0.33 0.44 0.48
ResNet50
BIM4 81.91 10.81 0.04 0.62 0.83 0.90
D2B10 30.29 4.26 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09
D2B20 58.82 6.27 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.17
D2B30 72.43 7.28 0.10 0.18 0.24 0.26
D2B40 80.06 7.88 0.11 0.24 0.32 0.35
D2B50 84.52 8.25 0.11 0.30 0.41 0.44
6.9 Adversarial Examples of Different Scales
We show the generated adversarial examples using D2B with different settings in Figure 9 and
Figure 10. Figure 9 demonstrates samples of a targeted attack on ResNet50 and Figure 10 an
untargeted attack on ResNet152-Adv. We can observe that most of our adversarial examples are
indistinguishable from real images (top row). For few cases such as the 3rd column in the last row
(with large quantile change), we observe the presence of a repeating pattern. We speculate this is
because the attack was only applied to the first a few representative throttle planes, which may not
be as abstract as other deeper layers. This effect can be alleviated by including more throttle planes
when launching the attack.
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Figure 9: Adversarial Samples on ResNet50 of Different Scales
D2B10
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Figure 10: Adversarial Samples on ResNet152-Adv of Different Scales
6.10 Typical Throttle Plane Distributions
We present some typical distributions from selected throttle planes in Figure 11 and Figure 12.
Figure 11 shows distribution density graphs of 4× 4× 1 slice (width×height×channel) of selected
throttle planes for VGG16, and Figure 12 for ResNet152-Adv. We observe that they have relatively
different shapes and scales, which supports the choice of neuron specific bound in our attack. We
also observe that activation distributions of deeper planes (e.g., Figure 11d and Figure 12e) more
resemble a normal distribution. The first few rows and columns in Figure 11a and Figure 12a look
less like a normal distribution. This is due to the existence of zero padding in those layers. The
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padding operation makes the first a few neurons around the border of a channel distinct from the
inner neurons.
(a) Throttle Plane 1: After conv1_2
(b) Throttle Plane 2: After VGG16 conv2_2
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(c) Throttle Plane 3: After VGG16 conv3_3
(d) Throttle Plane 4: After VGG16 conv4_3
Figure 11: Typical Distributions of Selected Throttle Planes from VGG16
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(a) Throttle Plane 1: After the First Convolution
(b) Throttle Plane 2: Last Layer of Group 1 Before Sum
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(c) Throttle Plane 3: Last Layer of Group 2 Before Sum
(d) Throttle Plane 4: Last Layer of Group 3 Before Sum
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(e) Throttle Plane 5: Last Layer of Group 4 Before Sum
Figure 12: Typical Distributions of Selected Throttle Planes from ResNet152-Adv
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